In a politically turbulent and disaster stricken world, those more fortunate call for relief donations. It is comforting to think that our dimes and quarters, including those paid in taxes, can make a difference in the suffering of other humans, but the sad truth is that many of the agencies we trust to provide food are actually rife with inefficiencies that actually harm their goals. In fact, the historical context of food aid hinders effective work and, despite decades of restructuring, the American food aid program is still in desperate need of reform. Other donor countries and private charities have set excellent examples to follow, but the United States must overcome its internal farm lobby if it hopes to become a true leader of international development.
Over the years, the United Nations and member countries have formalized food aid enterprises. The United Nations created the World Food Program (WFP) in 1963 to coordinate donor countries’ food aid efforts. Today, fifty percent of all food aid is channeled directly through WFP, and it continues to coordinate most food aid.[1]WFP is particularly involved in disaster emergency food aid, by which it channels millions of dollars into individual disaster aid initiatives alone.[2] Food aid can be described using the two categories of development and disaster, with compelling reasons to invest in both of these types. Food insecurity is closely linked to political instability[3], informing global interest in development aid, and “families in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia spend up to 80 percent of their incomes on food,”[4]left bereft in times of crisis. When people have to spend such a significant portion of their livelihoods on food, it must be incredibly valuable and scarce, which in turn can cultivate instability and violence. These dismal worldwide conditions have greatly influenced development food aid priorities. Compared to its other food initiatives, American food aid policies best address conflict and natural disasters, which contribute to an estimated annual loss of forty-two million human life years. Furthermore, the number of refugees and displaced persons worldwide is currently at its recorded height.[5]In both cases of chronic and acute international demand for food, countries with the means have clear incentives support their peers.
Among them, the United States has always been the primary donor, giving around half of global food aid.In 2008, the farm bill changed course to focus on humanitarian response as opposed to surplus disposal and trade promotion, priorities which had dominated the previous half century.[6]In history, political interests drive reform more often than research, policy, or development goals. However, because American food aid efforts were first established during the Eisenhower administration to serve Cold War interests, today they are slow, costly, and inefficient,[7]even considering years of reform. The United States began donating food aid in 1954 when it passed US Public Law (PL) 480, which clearly prioritized surplus disposal and export goals over international interests. Framers of the bill hoped to increase domestic grain prices and encourage future overseas markets by donating surplus grain for free. PL 480 became a political tool in the 1960s when it was explicitly modified to favor noncommunist recipient countries. In the 1980s, the United States reformed its food aid to remove its former political goals, and in the 1990s domestic surplus grain diminished significantly, reducing the need for surplus disposal.[8]Before 2014, the U.S. government spent an average of 1.5 billion dollars on international food assistance every year, and in 2013 President Obama successfully proposed substantial food aid reforms for the 2014 budget,[9]which implemented changing food aid priorities. However, even as shifting priorities result in new policies, remnants of Cold War priorities continue to stymie food aid goals.
One troubling example is cargo preference, an obvious Cold War policy. This mandated that American-flagged vessels ship at least half – and in some years up to seventy-five percent – of American food aid abroad. The original goal was maintain a reserve of ships and crew for the Navy in case of conflict. Today, these shipping costs increase the cost of food aid by $140 million every year, even though seventy percent of vessels approved for cargo preference do not meet military requirements, and many vessels today are actually owned by foreign holding companies. In fact, the Department of Defense is indifferent toward loosening cargo preference restrictions.[10]If a Cold War policy meant to support a supply of American military-ready ships for conflict is currently no longer necessary, unable to achieve its goal even if it were necessary, and also actively interfering with other foreign policy interests, clearly it is in desperate need of reform. The Navy has no present or future use for ships that do not meet its standards or are owned by foreign investors. It would be much cheaper to open up food aid transportation to other shipping options.
Another decades-old inefficiency is monetization. Monetization is more costly because of double expenditures; the government buys the food from domestic farmers at a loss to give to non-governmental organizations, which then sell it abroad for below market rates. This process wasted $219 million dollars between 2010 and 2013, the equivalent of a quarter of United States taxpayer dollars spent on food aid during those three years.[11]The food itself is not the waste of money, but it is so much more expensive because it is paid for twice. While there are some who would argue that monetization does serve to fund various NGOs’ overseas charity work,[12]the U.S. government could more simply and efficiently just fund those NGOs directly, albeit with accounting and oversight, rather than funneling the money through its food aid program. Democratic Representative Christopher Coons and Republican Representative Bob Corker have repeatedly submitted joint bills to remove monetization from food aid policy throughout the last few years, with little luck.[13]Monetization is a concerning food aid practice as it loses the government hundreds of millions of dollars. If American taxpayers are told they are paying for food aid, the money should actually be going to making food more accessible to people in need across the globe, instead of poorly equipping non-profits with inefficient funding.
Current food aid policies not only hurt American taxpayers, but it also harms local farmers in recipient countries by fostering a dependence on free or subsidized American crops, achieving, in a sense, the outdated goal of creating new markets for American grain. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa still produces less food than it did in the 1970s before American food aid increased five-fold,[14]and after the Haitian earthquake, “local rice farmers were put out of business when markets were flooded with cheap American rice, sold to help fund the recovery effort.”[15]In both cases of development and emergency food aid, good intentions can lead to unexpected economic devastation, damaging any chances of lasting food security. There is little point in funding a program which directly contradicts its own goals. A situation in which the population is reliant on foreign food imports, having lost its own agricultural economy, can only worsen both security and relief outcomes.
There are several possible remedies for the outdated policies of American food aid. Cash and food vouchers, which arecheaper and more adaptable in face of climate change,[16]can directly develop local agricultural economies as well as provide for people in emergency situations. The U.S. Food Stamp Program implemented a flexible program to address the problem of food insecurity in Southeastern states after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Immediately after the hurricane, the Food Stamp Program sent food directly to shelters and like facilities, but, in the days following, the program granted temporary food stamp eligibility to hurricane survivors meeting specified qualifications. Local people used these food stamps to purchase food, first at emergency food aid distribution centers, then eventually at local retailers as they re-opened. This program therefore contributed to the local economy and built a more sustainable solution for food security.[17]The Food Stamp Program’s emergency aid voucher program seems like an ideal compromise, because it supports immediate food security needswhile also establishing long-term food economies so that the local population can sustain its own development. If the United States does this for their own people, perhaps they should do it for others, rather than promoting change only when it benefits their own farm interests. However, the United States still primarily gives its food aid in the form of food commodity, whereas all other major donor countries, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, European Union member states, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland have increasingly given cash.[18]It is unfair for the United States to set a successful standard of food aid, only to not follow it, even as its donor peers do. When the stakes are this high, the United States should accept its responsibilities as a leading donor country to enact sustainable policies.
In fact, for this very reason, influential political figures, including a former director of the World Food Program and Clinton’s Agriculture Secretary, are pushing for U.S. food aid policies to include agricultural development. Specifically, both figures wrote a joint op-ed calling on President Obama to focus on agricultural development rather than food commodity aid.[19]The Gates Foundation is also shifting its food focus from food aid to agricultural development, with strong success stories. Egypt, which had previously relied heavily on American food commodity is now self-reliant after decades of receiving this aid.[20]Another promising policy is farm-to-farm programs, which provide technical expertise to developing farmers, address dependency, and work toward eliminating the need for long-term commodity aid. This is already a possibility: Malawi required emergency food aid in 2005 and by 2007, after receiving farm-to-farm program support, was sending aid to neighboring countries.[21]However, these programs need to be carefully and holistically considered in order to guarantee the greatest impact. Eight out of ten African farmers and six out of ten Asian farmers are women, who receive only five percent of agricultural support.[22]Therefore, any lasting agricultural development plan must include gendered perspectives on division of labor and gendered roles and norms; otherwise, these plans might never meet their intended targets. Not only should it be a food aid priority not to hurt agricultural development, but it should also be critical to support this development in places that are food insecure.
Sadly, popular discourse pits an influential contributor to American food security against international agricultural development. American farmers have a vested interest in direct food commodity aid, because of the perception that it helps subsidize their farms.[23]The goals of the United States Farm Bill do in fact greatly affect the scope and efficiencies of U.S. food aid contributions every year,[24]but just because food aid is tied to the farm bill does not mean it should be. In a joint op-ed, Republican Representative Royce and Democratic Representative Engel cite instead that food aid accounts for less than one percent of United States food exports, and Obama’s Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack believes food aid reform would not hurt American farmers.[25]Within the United States, perhaps the biggest opponent to food aid reform is the farm lobby, but if experts say that it does not need to be a steadfast opponent, perhaps the food aid model can change, from giving food commodity as its main food aid to offering cash and food vouchers instead.
Furthermore, in regards to the one percent of farm exports that would be affected by food aid reform,[26]today, only a small number of agribusiness firms – namely Monsanto, ConAgra, and Cargill – receive the most government subsidies; in short, the farm bill has created an oligarchy of GMO (genetically modified organism) producers, even though it was originally intended to support local farmers and keep food prices accessible. Small and medium-sized farms, the intended beneficiaries of the farm bill, can no longer compete. The legislation does nothing to help its desired recipients anyways, shifting its help to corporations producing GMOs, demonstrating that it requires overarching reform, even outside of food aid.
In fact, GMOs have been playing an unfortunate role in American food aid efforts for some time. GMOs first appeared in the 1990s when genetically modified soy and corn were first approved for U.S. production, at which time USAID and WPF began unknowingly sending GMO food to recipient countries that had very different regulations for GMOs.[27]Many recipient countries are concerned about allergenic potential and cross-contamination, which can reduce biodiversity and drive out local strains of grain. GMO cross-contamination was particularly controversial in Nicaragua, the origin country of corn.[28]Since there is no segregated system for producing genetically modified and non-genetically modified grain in the United States, there has since been widespread cross-contamination, and the vast majority of American grown grain is impacted by GMOs.[29]This deeply concerns food aid policy-makers, who, if they insist on sending food commodity aid, must seriously consider the role of GMOs in their diplomatic development efforts. No matter their stance on GMOs, they must accept that many recipient countries have a very different perspective, and policy-makers should very well take it as further reason to not simply send American grain.
The United States has a clear leadership role to play in the realm of international food aid. Not only is the United States the uncontested primary donor, but it also plays a principal role in the United Nations and the World Food Programme. As a result, it must assume the responsibility to improve food aid programs, instead of lagging behind other countries. The United States must recognize the flaws of the current food aid system – including cargo preferences and monetization – and improve these programs with tested alternatives – such as cash aid and agricultural development – and confront the obstacles to this progress, namely the misinformed farm lobby. Only when it does so can the United States hope to be the leader of development and security promotion it claims.
About the Author
Audrey Chu is a senior majoring in International Relations and the Global Economy and minoring in Mathematical Finance. She volunteers for Planned Parenthood and mentors robotics teams in her free time.
Works Cited
[1]Jennifer Clapp, The political economy of food aid in an era of agricultural biotechnology (2005).
[2]Joanna Syroka, and Richard Wilcox. Rethinking international disaster aid finance (2006), 197-214.
[3]Catherine Bertini and Dan Glickman, Farm Futures: Bringing Agriculture Back to US Policy (Washington, DC: 2009).
[4]Bertini,Farm Futures: Bringing Agriculture Back to US Policy.
[5]Erin Lentz, Stephanie Mercer, and Christopher Barrett. International Food Aid and Food Assistance Programs and the Next Farm Bill (Washington, DC: 2017).
[6]Lentz.International Food Aid and Food Assistance Programs and the Next Farm Bill.
[7]Ed Royce and Eliot Engel. International food aid needs reform (Washington, DC: 2016).
[8]Clapp, The political economy of food aid in an era of agricultural biotechnology.
[9] Royce. International food aid needs reform.
[10]Royce. International food aid needs reform.
[11]Royce. International food aid needs reform.
[12]Andrew Natsios. Modernizing U.S. International Food Aid: Reaching More for Less (Washington, DC: 2013).
[13]Natsios. Modernizing U.S. International Food Aid: Reaching More for Less.
[14]Diriye, Food Aid and the Challenge of Food Security in Africa, 396-403.
[15]Royce. International food aid needs reform.
[16]Diriye, Food Aid and the Challenge of Food Security in Africa, 396-403.
[17]Hanson, Kenneth, Emergency food assistance reaches hurricane victims(2006).
[18]Clapp, The political economy of food aid in an era of agricultural biotechnology.
[19]Bertini, Farm Futures: Bringing Agriculture Back to US Policy.
[20]Bertini,Farm Futures: Bringing Agriculture Back to US Policy.
[21]Diriye,Food Aid and the Challenge of Food Security in Africa, 396-403.
[22]Bertini,Farm Futures: Bringing Agriculture Back to US Policy.
[23]Diriye,Food Aid and the Challenge of Food Security in Africa, 396-403.
[24]Lentz. International Food Aid and Food Assistance Programs and the Next Farm Bill.
[25]Royce. International food aid needs reform.
[26]Royce. International food aid needs reform.
[27]Clapp,The political economy of food aid in an era of agricultural biotechnology.
[28]Clapp,The political economy of food aid in an era of agricultural biotechnology.
[29]Clapp, The political economy of food aid in an era of agricultural biotechnology.
Leave a Reply